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1  Introduction 
 
 
 
There appears to be no precise definition for cybercrime or 'computer crime'. 
Computer crime has been described as "any violation of criminal law that 
involves knowledge of computer technology by the perpetrator, investigator or 
prosecution".
1  Cybercrime (online misdemeanour) has been defined as 
including any crime carried out primarily by means of a computer on the 
Internet; for example, hacking into or damaging a computer network, accessing 
and stealing electronic data without authorisation, and cyberstalking (via e-mail 
threats of violence or extortion).
2 Thus, on the one hand, a computer may be 
the 'object' of the crime when there is theft of computer hardware or software, 
or a computer may be the 'subject' of a crime when it is used as an 'instrument' 
to commit traditional crimes such as fraud, theft, extortion, or 'new' types of 
criminal activity such as denial of service attacks and malware, identity theft, 
child pornography, copyright infringement, mail or wire-fraud.
3
                                            
*  Prof Fawzia Cassim, Associate Professor, Department of Criminal and Procedural Law, 
University of South Africa, admitted attorney and conveyancer. 
1   See Bazelon et al 2006 ACLR 260. It should be noted that the terms 'computer crime', 
'cybercrime', 'information technology crime', 'high tech crime' and 'IT crime' are used 
interchangeably. Also see Van der Merwe 2007 JCRDL 309-310 regarding attempts by 
academic writers to define 'computer crime'. 
2   Berg 2007 Michigan Bar Journal 18. 
 
 
3   The focus has thus shifted to the different categories of offences, such as fraud by 
computer manipulation, computer forgery and child pornography. Cybercrime also involves 
the use of a computer or computer technology to commit illegal access, illegal interception, 
data interference, system interference, misuse of devices, forgery and fraud. See further 
Cybercrime Law 2007 www.cybercrimelaw.net/; Brenner and Clarke 2005 John Marshall 
JCIL  665-666; Miquelan-Weissmann 2005 John Marshall JCIL  331, and Brenner and 
Koops 2004 JHTL  7. Regarding pirated software programmes, see DPA 2009 
www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/ 14, which addresses the proliferation of pirated goods in the 
Philippines. F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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Recently the face of cybercrime has changed as a result of the emergence of 
new Internet environments, organised cybercrime groups and new 'smart' 
viruses.
4  Thus, the development of new accessible technologies and the 
expansion of the Internet have led to a number of new criminal behaviours.
5 
This has led to a call for specialised legislation to combat these new criminal 
behaviours. The profile of the cybercriminal has also changed from the 'nerdy 
loner' to one who is now a syndicate member.
6 However, cybercrime knows no 
borders.
7
Computer crimes also impact inter alia  on the protection of privacy, the 
prosecution of economic crimes, the protection of intellectual property and 
procedural provisions that assist in the prosecution of computer crimes. Many 
governments are adopting computer-specific criminal codes that address 
unauthorised access and manipulation of data. However, countries that 
regulate political discourse find it difficult to regulate freedom of expression, as 
what constitutes acceptable speech in one country is unacceptable in another 
country.
 It is irrelevant for the perpetrator and the victim of a crime to meet, as 
the unlawful actions committed by a perpetrator in one country may have a 
direct and immediate effect in another country.  
 
8
                                            
4   Berg (n 2) 18. 
5   The development of the Internet and the advancement of computer technology have also 
resulted in the creation of new opportunities for those who engage in illegal activity. See 
Brenner 2001 Murdoch Univ EJL 1. Brenner argues that law enforcement officials (police 
officials) should be equipped with the necessary legal tools to pursue cybercriminals. To 
this end, every legal system should take adequate measures to ensure that its criminal 
and procedural laws can meet the challenges posed by cybercrimes.  
6   Berg (n 2) 20. 
7   The perpetrator who is physically located in one country can wreak havoc in other 
countries as the 'love bug' episode illustrates. The 'love bug' virus emanating from the 
Philippines, launched during May 2000, affected twenty countries and caused $10 billion in 
damage. As there were no relevant computer offence laws in the Philippines, the creator of 
the virus escaped punishment due to the lack of appropriate laws with which to charge him 
(the perpetrator). This virus illustrates the problems that this type of activity poses for law 
enforcement (the police) in cross-border prosecution,  such as the lack of cybercrime-
specific criminal laws, the inadequacy of criminal laws, the lack of international 
agreements, the difficulties with jurisdiction and the difficulty in determining the number 
and effect of cyber offences. Brenner (n 5) 3. Also see Wilson 2006 Aust LJ 700 and 
Goodman and Brenner 2002 IJLIT 140-141, for further discussion about the 'love bug' 
virus. 
  
8   Eg, the dissemination of Nazi propaganda denying that the Holocaust existed is illegal in 
Germany, and it is also a crime to display, exchange or sell Nazi paraphernalia in France. 
However, such material is easily accessible on the World Wide Web. It should be noted F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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The article looks at cyber legislation formulated to address cybercrime in the 
United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, India and 
the Gulf States. The South African position is also examined. The study reveals 
that the inability of national laws to address the challenges posed by 
cybercrimes has led to the introduction of specialised cyber legislation. It is 
advocated that countries should amend their procedural laws to include 
intangible evidence of cybercrimes, as opposed to tangible evidence of 
traditional crimes. A balanced approach that considers the protection of 
fundamental human rights and the need for effective prosecution of 
cybercrimes has been mooted. International co-operation between countries is 
also required to address the global nature of cybercrime. 
 
 
2  Challenges deriving from cybercrime 
Cybercrime differs from traditional crimes because it can be committed with 
relative ease, it requires few resources and it can be committed in a jurisdiction 
without the offenders being physically present.
9 The fact that cybercrime does 
not require physical proximity between a victim and perpetrator also 
compounds the problem of detection.
10  The challenges deriving from 
cybercrime arise in four main areas namely, logistics, combating anonymity, 
accessing electronic information and transnational enforcement.
11
                                                                                                                               
that the US is regarded as a haven for those who create and maintain web sites that 
disseminate hate speech, racist views, and Nazi and Neo-Nazi philosophies, because of 
its strong First Amendment protection for free speech, whilst these viewpoints or acts are 
outlawed in other countries. Germany has also revised its computer crime laws to provide 
that internet service providers such as Compuserve cannot be held liable for contents that 
they merely transmit. Id 149, 222. Also see Bazelon et al (n 1) 307-308. 
9   Regarding examples of cybercrime, see Goodman and Brenner (n 7) 142, 146-150. 
10   Other difficulties have been recognised: although cybercrime is committed by a small 
percentage of the population, the number of cybercrimes exceeds that of traditional 
crimes; there are also difficulties with gathering evidence and apprehending perpetrators; 
cybercrime patterns are not well documented; it is also difficult to categorise crimes; 
inaccurate cybercrime statistics exist because many cybercrimes go undetected and many 
are unreported. See Brenner and Clarke (n 3) 666-667. 
  Criminal 
11   Allan 2005 NZLR 150. Allan examines the problems posed by cybercrime, and notes that 
orthodox responses such as criminalisation, the enhancement of enforcement powers and 
the use of countering technology are ineffective in a virtual context. Allan advocates the F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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laws regulating cyberspace tend to result in few prosecutions due to the 
jurisdictional difficulties and additional resources required in tracking down 
cyber criminals in different countries (across different jurisdictional borders).
12 
Criminal anonymity involves using sophisticated re-routing techniques and 
hacking incidents which remain anonymous. Privacy interests also compound 
the issue.
13
An important challenge to state officials in prosecuting cybercrime is one of 
jurisdiction. Traditionally, crime and punishment were seen to be locally based, 
regional or national. However, this has changed today with the transnational 
character of cybercrime posing many problems.
  
 
14  The globally connected 
Internet has made cybercrime a trans-border problem with the result that "no 
island is an island".
15  The  'love bug'  virus illustrates that the existence of 
cybercrime laws is a fundamental prerequisite for investigation as well as 
prosecution. The Philippine's failure to have cybercrime legislation in place 
meant that a Philippine national inflicted damage in twenty countries but 
suffered no consequences for his acts, This failure to have legislation impacted 
around the globe and illustrated the fragility of our modern networked world.
16
                                                                                                                               
use of alternative strategies such as those that encourage Internet users to share the 
burden of securing informational privacy.  
12   However, Brenner and Clarke advocate that criminal sanctions are preferable to civil 
liability in addressing cybercrime. They suggest that a system of administrative regulation 
backed by criminal sanctions will provide incentives to create a workable deterrent to 
cybercrime. They argue that prohibiting Internet access except through licensed Internet 
service providers, imposing certification and reporting requirements on larger 
organisations, requiring transparency regarding the security-related characteristics of 
information technology products and mandating cyber risk insurance are necessary if 
society is to control cybercrime. See Brenner and Clarke (n 3) 659-709. 
13   See, eg, the Fourth Amendment in the US Constitution, which protects rights and 
freedoms against unreasonable search and seizure.  
14   The 'love bug' virus is an example of this. See inter alia Goodman and Brenner (n 7) 140.  
15   See Xingan 2007 Webology 2. 
16   Onel de Guzman (a former computer science student) was identified as the person 
responsible for creating and disseminating the 'love bug' virus. However, Philippine law did 
not criminalise hacking or the distribution of viruses. The Philippine officials struggled with 
the question of how to prosecute De Guzman. They finally charged him with theft and 
credit card fraud but the charges were dismissed. De Guzman could not be extradited for 
prosecution in other countries such as the US (which has cybercrime laws) because the 
conduct attributed to De Guzman was not a crime in the Philippines. Extradition treaties 
require 'double criminality', namely the act for which a person is extradited must be a crime 
in both the extraditing country and the country seeking the extradition. De Guzman could 
not be charged for disseminating the 'love bug' virus. This meant that no one was 
prosecuted for the 'love bug' virus. See Goodman and Brenner (n 7) 142. 
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Therefore, the international character of cybercrime calls for international co-
ordination and co-operation to address computer-related offences worldwide. 
Law enforcement officials cannot prosecute cyber criminals unless countries 
have adequate laws in place outlawing such criminal activities. 
 
Cybercrime is said to be becoming easier to carry out as society becomes more 
dependent on the Internet. This increases the risk of a catastrophic attack. 
However, it has been suggested that certain types of cybercrime can create 
more benefits than costs.
17  Cybercrime differs from other crimes in that it 
operates within a highly organised system making it more likely to create 
beneficial effects that outweigh their costs, and the perpetrators usually 
possess a particular psychology that make them amenable to more innovative 
law enforcement methods.
18 The millions of computers which are connected to 
the Internet are vulnerable to the threat of cybercrime. This vulnerability is 
compounded by the combination of more creative hackers, the prevalence of 
powerful computers, and the existence of broadband Internet connections. 
Untrained and apathetic users have also created an environment which is 
vulnerable to damaging attacks on the information infrastructure.
19 Traditional 
law enforcement tools are regarded as ineffective in addressing these crimes. 
Therefore, it is suggested that a non-traditional response would be appropriate, 
such as securing the information infrastructure by working with industry and 
Internet users and by enlisting hackers to achieve greater security.
20  The 
assistance of hackers and users is regarded as important in securing the 
Internet because hackers are seen as a valuable resource for security 
knowledge. Therefore, it is advocated that cybercrime policy should encourage 
their co-operation and avoid alienating them.
21
                                            
17   See Anon 2006 Harvard LR 2442. 
18   Id 2443. 
19   The risk of a serious cyber attack by terrorists and the ease with which hacking is carried 
out further compound matters. Thus the prosecution of cybercrime is important not only to 
law enforcement officers (the police) but also to global security. Id 2445. 
20   Anon (n 17) 2463. 
21   It is advocated that hackers should be encouraged to work with vendors and co-operate 
with law enforcement. However, those hackers convicted of conducting the most 
destructive attacks should receive the harshest of punishments. Id 2457-2463. 
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Another challenge facing the IT environment is the diverging interests of those 
affected by cybercrime: on the one hand, individuals have a right to free speech 
and privacy and on the other hand there is society's need to combat crime and 
secure community networks and the interests of big business. Informational 
privacy is thus important. The assistance of third parties such as Internet 
service providers and telecommunication entities would assist law enforcement 
agencies in their fight against cybercrime.
22 Co-operation with the private sector 
is also encouraged. A balanced approach that considers privacy interests and 
the need for effective prosecution of cybercrime is the way forward.
23 The need 
to eradicate cybercrime also depends on reaching a consensus on minimal 
standards for securing fundamental procedural due process guarantees such 
as respecting the rights of citizens under search and seizure provisions.
24
A need thus arises for worldwide criminalisation to address the cybercrime 
problem. However, some undeveloped countries may have inadequate 
investigative powers or technological capacities to address the problem. 
Attempts to adopt, harmonise and streamline international cybercrime laws by 
conventions such as the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime 
(hereinafter the COECC) and the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime are lauded. However, international co-operation 
by countries is needed to comply with these Conventions to ensure the integrity 
of the Internet and address the global nature of cybercrime. The COECC, which 
was signed in Hungary on the 23
rd of November 2001, aims at encouraging 
countries to combat cybercrime.
 
 
25
                                            
22   Allan (n 11) 163. 
23   Id 178.  
24   Also see Kerr 2005/2006 Harvard LR 532-585. 
 It criminalises certain computer actions such 
25   The Council of Europe has drawn up a convention to respond to the challenges posed by 
cybercrime. The Convention was adopted on 8 November 2001 by the Foreign Ministers of 
the Council's member states and non-member states, namely the United States, Canada, 
Japan and South Africa. It was opened for signature on 23 November 2001 in Budapest, 
Hungary. The Convention entered into force on 1 July 2004. The Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Cybercrime requiring states to criminalise the dissemination of racist and 
xenophobic material through computer systems was adopted on 7 November 2002 by the 
Committee of Ministers. The two main objectives are to harmonise criminal law in the fight 
against racism and xenophobia on the Internet and to improve international co-operation in 
this area. It was opened for signature during January 2003. It should be noted that F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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as the interception of non-public transmission of computer data, establishes 
corporate liability, calls for the production of stored computer data and 
recommends mutual assistance between countries during investigations.
26 The 
COECC is said to be the first international treaty on crimes via the Internet and 
other computer networks dealing particularly with infringements of copyright, 
computer-related fraud, child pornography and violations of network security. 
The main objective is to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the 
protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate 
legislation and fostering international co-operation. Although the COECC aims 
at international co-operation in prosecuting cybercrime, it contains no provision 
for co-operation in securing networks.
27  Thus, the Convention's underlying 
premise that harmonising national laws will improve law enforcement's ability to 
react across national borders is laudable but the difficulty lies in its 
implementation.
28
3  Comparative perspective 
 
 
 
Many countries have legal systems which involve a combination of English law, 
Roman Dutch law and constitutional law. These laws are promulgated to apply 
to traditional crimes such as murder, assault, theft and fraud. A problem 
therefore arises when these 'antiquated' procedural laws are confronted with 
infringements that arise in the IT environment. The inadequacy of existing 
criminal laws to address computer offences has led to the introduction of new 
legislation to keep abreast with modern technology. 
 
                                                                                                                               
European Cybercrime law is based primarily on the COECC. See further, Cybercrime Law 
2007 www.cybercrimelaw.net/  
26   See Jahankhani 2007 IJESDF 9 for further discussion.  
27   Also see Miquelan-Weissmann (n 3) 329-361. It should be noted that SA has signed but 
not ratified the COECC. It is the only African country to have done so.  
28   Brenner and Clarke (n 3) 671. The cyber crime treaty is also criticised for not providing 
adequate guarantees for fundamental due processes. See Miquelan-Weissmann (n 3) 
356-357. F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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3.1  United States of America 
The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 (hereinafter, the 
NIIPA or 'the 1996 Act') protects individuals against various crimes involving 
"protected computers".
29  Both the US Secret Service and the FBI have 
jurisdiction over offences committed under the NIIPA, the latter through the 
USA  Patriot Act.
30  The  Electronic Communications Privacy Act  of 1986 
(hereinafter the ECPA) is also aimed at non-traditional crimes such as hacking. 
It prohibits any obtaining, altering or preventing unauthorised access to 
electronic storage.
31
Federal offences include cyber fraud, identity theft, spamming, cyber stalking, 
cyber fraud, making intentional false representations online, identity theft, the 
use of password sniffers, the decimation and creation of worms as well as the 
writing of viruses and Trojan horses, website defacements and web-spoofing.
 
 
32 
Many states such as Arkansas and California have enacted anti-spam laws to 
regulate the use of Internet communications that send unsolicited 
advertisements for the purpose of promoting real property, goods, or services 
for sale or lease. Statutes have also been enacted in some states such as 
Arkansas and Georgia to provide civil compensatory damages so as to 
encourage the victims of computer crimes to come forward.
33
                                            
29   See s 1030 of Title 18 of the NIIPA. This includes a computer involved in interstate 
commerce or communications or any computer attached to the Internet. Offences include 
the prohibition of access to information without authorisation or computer hacking. See s 
1030(a) regarding the types of offences and definition of electronic storage. It should also 
be noted that s 1030 confers jurisdiction to prosecute when the conduct at issue impacts 
upon the federal government and where the USA is itself the victim. See Bazelon et al (n 
1) 265. Also see Brenner and Koops (n 3) 25. 
30   See s 1030 (d) of the NIIPA. It should be noted that the Patriot Act was introduced on 23 
October 2001 to safeguard homeland security after the 9/11 attacks. Both the Patriot Act 
of 2001 and the Cyber Security Act of 2002 contain amendments to the NIIPA. 
31   See s 2701(a) of the ECPA. In US v Councilman 385 F3d 793 (First Circuit 2005), the 
court found that the ECPA was enacted to increase government's powers to wiretap so as 
to include the digital transmission of electronic data.  
32   The sale of non-prescriptive drugs, firearms, explosives, cigarettes, alcohol and visas on 
the Internet is strictly monitored. The No Electronic Theft Act regulates copyright offences 
and copyright management offences, while the Digital Millennium Copyright Act addresses 
piracy. For further information, see Snail and Madziwa 2008 Without Prejudice 30-31. 
33   See Bazelon et al (n 1) 304-305. 
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Jurisdictional problems arise for state prosecutors when causes of action are 
committed in different states, because the jurisdictional rules of criminal law 
require the prosecutor to prove that the defendant intended to cause harm 
within his state. As a result, many states have amended their jurisdictional rules 
to address the new concerns that arise from the global nature of the Internet. 
To illustrate this, Wisconsin's criminal statutes confer jurisdiction even where 
the cause of action has no consequence in the state; some states such as 
Arizona, Kansas, New York and Missouri allow jurisdiction where a result of the 
offence occurs in the state whether or not an element occurs in the state, whilst 
Alabama, California and  South Dakota have statutes conferring jurisdiction 
where an offence begins  outside the state but "consummates within the 
state".
34 US Code section 1030 also considers the nationality of the victim and 
it confers jurisdiction to prosecute when the conduct at issue impacts upon the 
federal government, where the US is itself the victim. The Michigan statute 
confers criminal jurisdiction whenever the victim of the offence resides in 
Michigan or is located in Michigan at the time of the commission of the criminal 
offence. It has also been held that the nationality of the offender could support 
extraterritorial jurisdiction because the federal government can exert personal 
jurisdiction over American citizens and American corporations anywhere in the 
world.
35
                                            
34   Thus, in the US many states take a broad approach to the question of jurisdiction. For 
example, in Arkansas the computer crime legislation provides that a person is liable for 
prosecution if the offence originates in the state or has consequences in the state 
(Arkansas Code s 5-27-606(2003)). In Northern Carolina it is an offence where the 
electronic communication was originally sent from or where it was originally received in the 
state (North Carolina General Statute s 14-453.2 (2002)). Also see Audal et al 2008 ACLR 
269-270. 
35   See US v Judd 46 F3d 961, 967 (California Circuit 1995). The case decisions in all states 
also address the issue of personal jurisdiction in terms of due process considerations of 
the Fourth Amendment, which guards against unreasonable searches and seizures. The 
cases consider the question of whether a non-resident defendant has "minimum contacts 
with the jurisdiction and has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the particular state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws". 
See Burger King Corporation v Rudzewicz 471 US 462, 474-475 (1985). Also see Finlay 
1999 TBJ 336 and Brenner and Koops (n 3) 38. 
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The case of US v Gorshov
36 raises controversy about a country's jurisdiction to 
enforce its law regarding cyberspace cases. The facts were that some Russian 
nationals were identified as hackers who had been breaking into the computer 
systems of American businesses. They were trapped by FBI agents into 
coming to an interview in the United States and were subsequently arrested. 
Information was retrieved from Russian computers by the FBI agents without a 
warrant. The District court found that there had been no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, which did not encompass extra-territorial searches of non-US 
citizens, nor was there any violation of Russian law. However, the Russian 
authorities charged the FBI agents with hacking and requested their presence 
for trial in Russia, but the American government did not comply.
37
In  United States v Thomas
  
 
38  the court found that the Western District of 
Tennessee could prosecute a San Francisco bulletin board operator for 
transporting obscene material electronically. Courts are perceived by the 
internet community not to be the best place to develop policy on cyber law or 
resolve on-line disputes because of their expense, their slowness and their lack 
of expertise about computer technology. The introduction of the Virtual 
Magistrate in the United States is a first attempt at creating an on-line 
arbitration mechanism to resolve disputes.
39 Nevertheless, the establishment of 
a  "real live"  cyberspace jurisdiction is said to be remote in time, as local 
governments and courts will resist it.
40
                                            
36   2001 WL 1024026.  The question arose whether the actions of the FBI agents were 
justified or not as an exercise of enforcement of jurisdiction. 
37   See Brenner and Koops (n 3) 21-22 for differing views regarding the question of whether 
the actions of the FBI agents were justified. 
38   74 F3d 70 (Sixth Circuit 1996). However, the effect of this case is uncertain for future 
litigation involving on-line jurisdiction because it is a criminal case (it involves child 
pornography). 
39   The idea was to offer arbitration for quick resolution of disputes involving users of on-line 
systems and those who claim to be affected by illegal messages, postings, files and 
system operators. Canada has a similar experimental system called the Cybertribunal 
which is based at the University of Montreal. The Tribunal is investigating possible court 
action to curb the dissemination of hate literature from Canadian sites over the Internet. 
See Blackwell 1997 Canadian Lawyer 22-23. 
40   Ibid. 
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Valiant attempts are being made in the USA to respond to the increase in 
cybercrime, such as the Project Safe Childhood to combat child exploitation on 
the Internet, and the use of specialised prosecutors to fight cyber crimes in the 
US Attorney's Offices nationwide.
41 During August 2008 the US Senate passed 
a Bill on cybercrime to modernise the country's computer crime laws and to 
provide prosecutors with more leeway in pursuing cyber criminals. Current 
federal cybercrime laws require prosecutors to demonstrate that the illegal 
activity caused at least $5,000 in damages before they can institute actions for 
unauthorised access to a computer. However, that threshold will now be 
eliminated under the new Bill. The new legislation contains the following 
amendments: it is a felony to install spyware or Keystroke-monitoring 
programmes on ten or more computers regardless of the amount of damages 
caused; the new legislation also enables identity theft victims to seek restitution 
for the loss of time and money spent restoring their credit; the Bill would also 
allow federal courts to prosecute cyber criminals who 'attack' computers located 
in the state in which they live;
42  and another new provision covers cyber 
extortion to address shortcomings in the existing law.
43 These new provisions 
will be added to a bill known as the Former Vice President Protection Act.
44 The 
new government under President Barack Obama is also presently reviewing 
cybercrime regulations.
45
The above discussion demonstrates that the United States is taking the lead in 
addressing cybercrime. The collaborative initiative involving the police, the 
 
 
                                            
41   Berg (n 2) 22. An initiative has also been launched by the US Electronic Crimes Task 
Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigations which brings law enforcement officers 
together with members of the private sector and academics in a collaborative effort against 
cybercrime. See Brenner and Clarke (n 3) 682. Regarding further attempts by the 
Department of Justice and FBI to address cybercrime, see Audal et al (n 34) 265-267.  
42   Current law provides that federal courts have jurisdiction only if a thief uses interstate 
communication to access the victim's PC. 
43   The existing law provides that the government can prosecute cyber extortionists who 
threaten to delete a victim's data or to damage a computer. There is no specific statute 
addressing cyber criminals who try to extort companies by publishing or releasing stolen 
information. However, this activity has now been criminalised. See Krebs 2008 
blog.washingtonpost-com/ 
44   Ibid. 
45   During February 2009, President Barack Obama instructed the National Security and 
Homeland Security Advisors to conduct a review of the plan, programmes and activities 
dedicated to cybersecurity including new regulations to combat cybercrime. See 
Cybercrime Law 2009 www.cybercrimelaw.net/ F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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private sector and academics is an encouraging attempt to involve all role 
players in the fight against cybercrime. The advent of the new Bill also 
illustrates that the US is taking the lead in updating outdated computer laws to 
keep abreast with advancing computer technology. The ratification of the 
COECC by the United States has received much needed support in the global 
fight against cybercrime.
46
There was widespread agreement in the 1980s that the United  Kingdom's 
existing computer law was outdated.
 
  
3.2  United Kingdom 
47 The UK's ratification of the COECC also 
led to calls to amend the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (the CMA). The CMA was 
consequently amended on 1 October 2008
48  to clarify the meaning of 
"unauthorised access" to a computer.
49 The inclusion of a new provision also 
makes it an offence to to make, adapt, supply or offer to supply any item of 
hardware, software or data for use in the commission of an offence under the 
Act.
50 The maximum penalty for unauthorised access to a computer system has 
been increased from six months to two years in prison.
51
                                            
46   See Anon 2006 Computer Fraud and Security 2-3. 
47   It should be noted that the English courts concluded that their existing laws did not 
accommodate nor reflect the changes brought about by computer technology. See inter 
alia R v Gold (1988) AC 1063, where the defendant was acquitted because there were no 
laws to prevent unlawful access to a computer. This led to the enactment of the Computer 
Misuse Act  1990. However, this act was soon found to be ineffective in addressing 
cybercrime. See McKenna 2004 Infosecurity Today 5. 
  Denial of service 
attacks is also criminalised, and the maximum penalty is ten years' 
imprisonment. It is also an offence to distribute hacking tools for criminal 
purposes. Although the amendments are lauded, it has been suggested that 
alternative government mechanisms are required to better address the growing 
48   See Leyden 2008 www.theregister.co.uk/ Although the Police and Justice Act 2006 deals 
mostly with policing reform, it also contains amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 
1990. Also see Fafinski 2008 Journal of Criminal Law 53-66. The article looks at the 
rationale behind the amendments and examines the implications for cyber law. It is noted 
that the particular problem of computer misuse presents difficulties for criminal law. 
Therefore, it is suggested that this issue be further explored to achieve alternative 
government mechanisms to address the problem. 
49   The new wording prohibits unauthorised acts relating to computers. 
50   See further, Fafinski (n 48) 59. 
51   This makes the offense serious enough that an extradition request can now be filed. F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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problem of computer misuse.
52  The Home Office has recently announced a 
proposal to make it harder for child sex-offenders to meet children online.
53
In the United Kingdom, the jurisdiction of the English courts was considered 
inter alia in R v Smith (Wallace) No 4.
 
 
54 The Court of Appeal had to consider 
the following facts: the physical presence of the defendant within England, the 
fact that substantial criminal activities took place in England, and whether or not 
it was necessary for the "last act" to be committed within its jurisdiction. The 
court found that the question of whether the English courts have jurisdiction or 
not depends on where the last act took place,
55 and it was established that a 
substantial part of the offence took place in England and Wales.  Thus, it 
appears that if the offender is within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom then 
the English courts have jurisdiction to try the offender. There is little judicial 
support for the approach in England and Wales that allows prosecution in 
cases where an element of the offence occurred within the court's jurisdiction. 
However, the statement that the terminatory approach has universal support is 
criticised.
56
The UK experience demonstrates that the UK is trying its best to keep cyber 
criminals at bay: the increase in the penalty for unauthorised access to a 
computer (from six months to two years) and the criminalisation of denial of 
service attacks illustrate a tougher stance on cybercrime. Innovative proposals 
aimed at child sex offenders have been introduced by the Home Office. The 
advent of the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit is also lauded. This initiative, which 
brings the police, the private sector and academics together to combat 
  
 
                                            
52   See Fafinski (n 48) 53-66. However, the advent of the initiative called the National Hi-Tech 
Crime Unit, which brings the police, private sector and academics together to combat 
cybercrime is lauded. See Brenner and Clarke (n 3) 682. 
53   This is designed to stop child sex-offenders using social networking websites. Registered 
child sex-offenders will now have to provide their e-mail addresses to the police or face 
five years in prison. The first UK Social Networking Guidance has also been published, 
which provides advice on how to stay safe online. See Anon The Peninsula 9. 
54   [2004] EWCA Crim 631. It should be noted that s 4 and s 5 of the CMA also provide that 
the UK has jurisdiction to try the offender if the offence is 'significantly linked' to the UK. 
55   This is the termination theory which is supported by much case law. See further, Ormerod 
2004 Crim LR 953. 
56   Ibid.  F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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cybercrime, ensures the participation of all of the key parties in the fight against 
cybercrime.  
 
3.3  Australia 
In the Australian context, cybercrime has been defined as "any unauthorised 
activity which involves or uses computers, digital technology, the Internet, 
communication systems or networks".
57  This definition may encompass a 
number of financially devastating attacks such as computer worms and viruses, 
Trojan programmes designed to capture personal information, large-scale 
phishing scams, and other means of identity theft.
58
The multi-jurisdictional dimension of the Internet has led to the enactment of 
special extra-territorial jurisdiction for computer-related offences. The Model 
Criminal Code and  Cybercrime Act  2001 (Cth) addresses computer-related 
crimes.
  The inadequacy of the 
existing criminal laws to address computer misuse and computer offences has 
led to calls for distinct statutory laws for computer offences in order to keep up 
with modern technology.  
 
59 The aim of the Cth is to protect the commercial integrity of systems 
that process and store information rather than the information itself.
60
                                            
57   See Bronitt and Gani 2003 Crim  LJ  304. The authors review the evolution of and the 
changing rationale for computer-related offences in Australia in their article. 
58   Wilson (n 7) 694. 
59   It should be noted that s 15(1)(a)(c) of the Australian Criminal Code 1995 provides that if 
the conduct occurred wholly outside Australia but the perpetrator is an Australian citizen, 
either the individual or corporation is subject to jurisdiction. The Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) 
which has been influenced by the COECC, has also improved evidence-gathering by 
introducing expanded search warrant powers to conduct covert surveillance. According to 
Janine Wilson, computer viruses and denial of service attacks are new computer offences 
which have arisen as a result of changing technology and the pervasiveness of the 
Internet. These offences cannot be effectively prosecuted under traditional criminal laws. 
Both the Cth and the amendments to the Criminal Code have attempted to fill this void by 
regulating unauthorised computer access and misuse. Id 699. It should be noted that New 
Zealand has also adopted criminal codes to address both the interception of digital 
communications and unauthorised access, namely the Crimes Act 1961. See Allan (n 11) 
159. 
60   Bronitt and Gani (n 57) 309. 
 
Jurisdiction in Australia is governed by a combination of judicial development of 
the common law and legislative reform. Australian criminal law assumes that 
"all crime is local" and this idea of territoriality has been criticised for failing to F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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consider the extra-territorial effect of offences.
61 The modern legislative trend is 
to extend the extra-territorial reach of offences. Consequently, the Cth extends 
jurisdiction extra-territorially and identifies the alleged offender's national status 
as the basis for conferring jurisdiction. Thus Australian citizens who commit 
computer offences in countries that have no real or important links to their 
home jurisdiction can now be prosecuted in terms of the Cth. To illustrate this, 
in  Director of Public Prosecution v Sutcliffe
62
It has been suggested that laws allowing the police to rapidly secure evidence 
stored on computers and to obtain real-time access to network traffic may be 
needed for Australia to join a global treaty aimed at fighting fraud and electronic 
crime.
  an Australian citizen, Brian 
Sutcliffe, was accused of stalking a Canadian actress who lived in Toronto. The 
charges were based on Sutcliffe's having telephoned the victim and written to 
her repeatedly over several years. The Australian prosecutor charged Sutcliffe 
with stalking but the magistrate dismissed the charges. The magistrate found 
that she lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter because the crime of 
stalking occurred in Canada, where the victim was located. However, the 
Supreme Court of Victoria reversed the decision. The Court found that Sutcliffe 
was a resident of Australia and had committed all of the ingredients of the crime 
"save for the harmful effect" in Australia. Therefore, it was held that his conduct 
and presence in Australia established a "sufficient connection"  to allow the 
court to exercise jurisdiction over the proceedings. 
 
63
a review is being carried out to establish what legislative changes 
would be needed if the Australian government were to join the 
COECC.
  According to the Federal Attorney General's Department project 
director, Steven Stroud,  
 
64
                                            
61 The termination theory, which has been regarded as the basis for criminal jurisdiction under 
the common law in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, South Australia and 
Victoria, has been criticised for its incompatibility with cybercrimes and legal entities. Id 
310. 
62 [2001] VSC 43 (Victoria, Australia).  
  
63  See Dearne Australian It News Limited 2009  http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story 
[accessed on 21 May 2009). 
64 The Convention, which provides a standard framework for investigating and prosecuting 
crimes involving computers across national borders, has already been adopted by more 
than 45 countries. The Convention provides for data retention by service carriers, and for F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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Some academic writers advocate the participation of private actors and 
stakeholders such as credit card companies and corporations in the fight 
against cybercrime, because these stakeholders have a vested interest.
65 
Janine Wilson also calls for effective partnerships with the private sector and 
international entities in order to effectively manage and combat cybercrime.
66 
The involvement of the private sector will help to improve the ability of law 
enforcement (the police) to effectively perform its role of combating cybercrime, 
and will also assist the private sector to address cyber-threats. This will also 
help to minimise financial damage.
67  In Australia, the role of the financial 
services industry in targeting cybercrime developed as a result of its being 
targeted by  cybercriminals, and in this regard the Australian Bankers 
Association has undertaken a number of projects addressing the problem of 
rising levels of cybercrime.
68
                                                                                                                               
the expedited collection of evidence stored on computers. However, Australia doesn't have 
laws to this effect. Therefore it is advocated that the current legislation needs to be 
amended to reflect these provisions. Ibid. 
65   These multinational corporations also have powers to prevent and detect crime that 
transcends national borders. Bronitt and Gani (n 57) 313, 317. 
66   Wilson (n 7) 694. The article considers inter alia, the nature and scale of cybercrime in the 
private sector and the financial services industry, and the need for effective public and 
private partnerships to stem the tide of increasing instances of cybercrime, to obtain 
recovery of lost funds, and to pursue the perpetrators of cybercrime. 
67   Id 700-701. 
68   The increase in cybercrime has placed an enormous financial burden on the financial 
services industry, for which its members already absorb much of the costs. Nevertheless, 
the partnership between the financial service industry and the police is said to be a 
successful one. It is advocated that a similar partnership should be extended to the private 
sector to counteract cybercrimes. Id 702. 
  
 
The extension of jurisdiction extra-territorially in the Cth adheres to the modern 
legislative trend. This is commendable. Although Australia has not joined the 
COECC, it is taking positive steps to review its current legislation to bring it in 
line with the COECC. The role of the Australian Banking Association in 
addressing the rising level of cybercrime is praiseworthy. One needs to foster 
co-operation and collaboration between the state and the private sector to 
effectively combat cybercrime. 
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3.4  India 
In India, cybercrime has to be voluntary and willful, an act that adversely affects 
a person or his property. The Cybercrimes and Information Technology Act (IT), 
2000  (the IT Act  2000)  was introduced to amend outdated laws and to 
adequately address cybercrime. Although the primary objective of the Act was 
to create an enabling environment for commercial use of IT, it also aims to 
provide a legal framework for the protection of all electronic records and other 
activities carried out by electronic means.
69 The Act also prescribes remedies 
for corporations where their computer systems are tampered with.
70 The IT Act 
2000 provides legal recognition of digital signatures and a legal framework for 
E-governance, offences, penalties, adjudication and investigation of 
cybercrime. Although the Act was welcomed it had shortcomings: it did not 
effectively address cyberstalking and cyber harassment; it contained 
ambiguous definitions; there was a lack of awareness by netizens about their 
rights; the question of jurisdiction was not addressed in the Act, and there were 
problems with extra-territorial jurisdiction.
71
Although cybercrime is on the increase it is not adequately reported to avoid 
harassment of offenders by the police, and companies also want to avoid bad 
publicity in the media.
 
 
72 However, the increase in ATM frauds and cybercrime 
led to calls to amend the IT Act 2000 and this resulted in the Cybercrime Bill 
being passed in Parliament during December 2008. It is called the Information 
Technology (Amendment) Bill.
73
                                            
69   Ch IX refers to penalties for damage to a computer and computer systems. Damages are 
fixed at Rs 1000 000 (Rupees) for affected persons. It also requires the adjudicating officer 
not below the rank of Director to adjudicate contraventions of the Act. Ch X refers to a 
Cyber Regulations Appellate Tribunal, which hears appeals against the decision of the 
adjudicating officer. Ch XI prescribes various offences such as tampering with computer 
documents, publishing obscene information and hacking. These offences will be 
investigated by a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of the 
Police. 
 It prescribes punishment which could extend to 
70   See further, DIT 2009 dit.mp.gov.in/ 
71   See Dadhich and Shukla (2007) "Cybercrimes" 414-425. 
72   The role of the police in combating cybercrime has been criticised because of the poor rate 
of conviction. However, the police in India are now becoming cybercrime aware and hiring 
trained people, and cyber police stations are functioning in major cities throughout the 
country. See Singh 2009 www.ind.ii.org/ 
73   This bill amends the Cyber Crimes and Information Technology Act 2000. See further 
Special Correspondent 2008 www.thehindu.com/ F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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life imprisonment for cyber terrorism and imprisonment of five years, and a fine 
of Rs10 lakh for publishing obscene material or transmitting obscene material in 
electronic form. A severe punishment is also prescribed for offences relating to 
the misuse of computers and communication equipment.
74
Pirated software causes heavy losses for software companies worldwide.
  
 
The Indian Government introduced the Amendment Bill to overcome 
shortcomings in the current law. The imposition of stringent punishment for 
cyber terrorism demonstrates the government's intention to prevent terrorists 
from using the Internet to perpetrate crime. The Cyber Appellate Tribunal is a 
specialised tribunal which hears appeals in cyber cases. Specialised tribunals 
are important because they prioritise and expedite cyber cases. 
 
3.5  Gulf states 
75 The 
Gulf Cooperation Council (the GCC) recommended during June 2007 that 
members adopt a treaty on cybercrimes among the Gulf States.
76
The United Arab Emirates (the UAE) was the first country to enact a 
comprehensive cyber law among the Gulf States. The Cybercrimes Act, Law 
No 2 of 2006, contains 29 articles, and it contains prohibitions inter alia against 
hacking, credit-card fraud, human trafficking, and abuse of any Islamic holy 
shrine or ritual.
 
 
3.5.1  United Arab Emirates 
77
                                            
74   The Bill also includes a proposal to introduce a Cyber Appellate Tribunal to hear appeals.  
 The Act prescribes punishment ranging from imprisonment to 
a fine or both. The terms of imprisonment range from one year to seven years 
and the fines range from Dh 20, 000 to Dh 50,000 (Dhirams) depending on the 
type of offence committed. The Act has been effective in addressing cybercrime 
75   To illustrate this, in 2006 alone, member companies of BSA lost around $40 billion (about 
Dh 146,9 million). Anon 2006b archive.gulfnews.com/  
76   It should be noted that the GCC members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE. For further discussion, see Howe 2007 archive.gulfnews.com/;  Roberts 
archive.gulfnews.com/ 
77   The UAE has also enacted an effective copyright law which takes tough action against 
piracy. Anon 2006a archive.gulfnews.com/ For further discussion of the UAE Cybercrime 
Act see also Van der Merwe et al ICT Law 101. F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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in the country. The GCC countries were urged to follow the example of the UAE 
by enacting comprehensive cyber legislation.  
 
3.5.2  Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia passed laws governing cybercrime during October 2006.
78
There are no specific laws addressing internet crime in Qatar. However, 
internet crimes are regulated by the Penal Code Act 11 of 2004. Currently, law 
enforcement authorities are unable to effectively prosecute cyber criminals, 
such as hackers, who steal personal data from computers and place malicious 
programmes on PCs undetected so as to gather information such as 
passwords and credit card numbers. Some hackers have been arrested and 
prosecuted in the past in terms of the country's telecommunications and 
criminal laws.
 The 
Shoura Council, which is responsible for enacting laws in Saudi Arabia, passed 
the Kingdom's first legislation to address the rise in electronic crime. The 
Council enacted provisions inter alia in illegal access and data interference. 
The legislation addresses offences such  as hacking, defamation, and the 
spread of terrorism. It is aimed at protecting individuals, companies and 
organisations from being defamed or harmed via the Internet. The maximum 
punishment under the new legislation is a prison sentence of ten years and a 
fine of $1,3 million. It can be imposed on anyone found guilty of hacking into 
government networks to steal information related to national security or using 
the Internet to support terrorism. 
 
3.5.3  Qatar 
79 However, there have been increasing calls for stringent legal 
steps to fight cybercrime.
80
                                            
78   Also see Bowman 2006 
 Difficulties are encountered with finding sufficient 
evidence for prosecution, as the perpetrators are often very intelligent and 
expert at covering their tracks. Victims are also hesitant to come forward and 
report crimes because of embarrassment. According to the ICTQATAR 
Regulatory Authority's legal and regulatory manager, Meegan Webb, there are 
www.itp.net/ 
79   See Anon 2006b archive.gulfnews.com/ 
80   Townson 2008 www.gulf-times.com/ F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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no specific laws addressing cyber criminal activity in Qatar.
81  A need also 
arises to extend current laws to cover businesses operating outside Qatar, but 
which are conducting business within the country. Qatar is said to account for 
4,3% of infected computers in the Middle East, and data-stealing hardware 
which infiltrates the most secure enterprises is said to be on the increase.
82 
Thus, a need exists for the formulation of adequate cybercrime legislation to 
combat cybercrime in Qatar.
83
4  South African law 
 
 
The Gulf states have recognised their vulnerability to cybercrime. They have 
taken steps to address this problem by introducing specialised legislation to 
address cybercrime. Qatar is also taking steps to enact adequate cybercrime 
legislation. It is submitted that the existence of adequate laws outlawing cyber 
criminal activities facilitates the prosecution of cyber criminals by law 
enforcement officials (the police). However, countries which introduce 
computer-specific criminal statutes should also adapt their rules of evidence to 
computer crimes to facilitate prosecution of cyber criminals. 
 
 
4.1  Position before the inception of the Electronic Communications 
and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
Most of the so-called traditional crimes such as murder, rape, theft, malicious 
injury to property and housebreaking originate from the South African common 
law, namely Roman-Dutch law. These traditional crimes deal only with 
tangibles whereas IT crime or cybercrime deals with intangibles. The 
                                            
81   ICTQATAR had been involved with drafting the telecommunications law, as well as the 
draft e-commerce law which is expected to be passed in the near future. Ibid. 
82   See Anon 2009 www.zawya.com. It should be noted that Trend Micro, an international 
company specialising in internet content security, is educating regional organisations and 
individuals about cybercrime. 
83   Townson (n 80). F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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perception has thus arisen that the common law cannot effectively deal with IT 
crime.
84
Before the commencement of the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act  25 of 2002 (hereinafter, the ECT), the common law and statutory law 
applied to online forms of offences such as indecency (child pornography), 
fraud (cyber fraud) and crimen injuria (cyber-smearing).
 
 
85
The case of S v Mashiyi
  However, the 
common law was ineffective in addressing crimes such as theft, extortion, 
spamming and phishing.  
 
86 considered the question of admissibility of computer-
generated documents. The court held that documents which contain 
information that has been processed and generated by a computer are not 
admissible as evidence in a criminal trial. On the other hand, the court found 
that where documents have been scanned to produce an electronic image of 
the original, then such an image is regarded as an exact image and is therefore 
admissible. However, in terms of the "prevailing law" the court could not admit 
into evidence the disputed documents which contained information that has 
been processed and generated by a computer.
87
                                            
84   To illustrate this, the common-law crime of theft is not adequate for combating IT crime in 
South Africa. So too the common-law crime of fraud. For further discussion about the 
inability of the common law to address IT crime, see Anon 2005 Cyber Law 121, par 346-
349. Also see Burchell 2002 SALJ 585, where Professor Burchell states that the common 
law is not suited to punish conduct such as unauthorised access to computer systems and 
altering computer data. However, he maintains that conduct committed using a computer 
as an instrument is generally covered by existing common-law crimes such as theft, fraud, 
invasion of privacy and murder.  
85   Prior to the inception of the ECT, crimes such as the possession and distribution of child 
pornography could be prosecuted in terms of s 27(1) and  s  28 of the Films and 
Publications Act 65 of 1996.  
86   2002 (2) SACR 387. It should be noted that this case was decided before the inception of 
the ECT. The court in Mashiyi referred to Narlis v South African Bank of Athens 1976 (2) 
SA 573 (A), which held that a computer print-out cannot be received as evidence in terms 
of s 34 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965. The reason for the rejection of a 
computer print-out as admissible evidence in the above case was that a computer is not a 
person and therefore a computer print-out is not a statement made by a person. The court 
also referred to S v Harper  1981  (1)  SA 88 (D) which found that computer-generated 
documents were admissible under the section only if the computer merely stored or 
recorded the information. 
87   S v Mashiyi 393 C-D. For further discussion about case law addressing IT crime before the 
inception of the ECT, see Van der Merwe et al (n 77) 70-74. 
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4.2  The ECT and its effect
88
The aim of the ECT is inter alia "to provide for the facilitation and regulation of 
electronic communications and transactions; to provide for the development of 
a national e-strategy for the Republic; to promote universal access for 
electronic communications, transactions and the use of electronic transactions 
by SMMEs; to prevent abuse of information systems and to encourage the use 
of e-government services". Indeed, the focus of the ECT is on protecting 'data' 
or data messages. The ECT deals comprehensively with cybercrime in Chapter 
X111. The following offences are punishable offences in the ECT, namely 
sections 86(4) and 86(3) address new forms of crimes, the law being called 
anti-cracking (anti-thwarting) and hacking law, which prohibits the selling, 
designing or producing of anti-security circumventing technology; e-mail 
bombing and spamming is addressed in terms of sections 86(5) and 45 of the 
ECT respectively; whereas the crimes of extortion, fraud and forgery are 
addressed in terms of section 87.
 
89  Section 3 of the ECT provides that in 
instances where the ECT has not made any specific provisions for criminal 
sanctions, then the common law will prevail. However, other statutory remedies 
prevail in the prosecution of other cybercrime. For example, money laundering 
and other financially related crimes are addressed in terms of the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Second Amendment Act 38 of 1999 (POCAA) and Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act 2001 (FICA).
90
The traditional requirement for documentary evidence was that it must be 
relevant and admissible, its authenticity must be proved and the original 
 
 
                                            
88   It should be noted that this discussion deals only with certain provisions of the ECT. A 
detailed discussion of the provisions of the ECT is beyond the scope of this article. 
89   Therefore, s 86 prevents unauthorised access to or interception of or interference with 
data; s 87 refers to computer-related extortion, fraud and forgery whilst s 88 refers to 
aiding and abetting. Regarding anti-pirating software and the protection of security 
software, see s 86(4) of the ECT and s 27 of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 respectively. 
The creation of law that addresses new crimes such as hacking is considered to be one of 
the greatest contributions by the ECT. It is submitted that any measure that protects the 
integrity of data is welcome, as this is fundamental to successful electronic commerce. 
Also see Mndzima and Snail 2009 www.hg.org/; Van der Merwe 2003 JCRDL 43-44 and 
Van der Merwe 2007 (n 1) 313 for further discussion on these provisions. 
90   It should be noted that POCAA targets organised crime, money laundering and criminal 
gang activities both nationally and internationally, whilst FICA outlaws money laundering 
and other unlawful actions. F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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document must be produced.
91 This has now changed as a result of the ECT. 
Section 15 of the ECT provides that the rules of evidence must not be used to 
deny admissibility of data messages on the ground that they are not in their 
original form.
92  The ECT thus creates a rebuttable presumption that data 
messages and or printouts are admissible in evidence.
93
The Act has also created 'cyber-inspectors'  who are authorised to enter 
premises or access information regarding cybercrime.
 It is submitted that this 
facilitates the admission of information in electronic format. This is 
commendable. 
 
94
                                            
91   See inter alia, Seccombe v AG 1919 TPD 270 at 277; S v Mpumlo 1986 (3) SA 485 (E) at 
489. However, there are exceptions to the general rule where the original document is 
destroyed, it cannot be located, or its production is illegal. Secondary evidence is 
admissible in these circumstances. See inter alia, Ex parte Ntuli 1970 (2) SA 278 (W). It 
should be noted that South African e-discovery obligations arise from the ECT read 
together with the Uniform Rules of Court (which were promulgated during 1965). 
92   S 15 deals with the admissibility and evidential weight of data messages. Regarding the 
definition of a data message, see s 1 of the ECT. It should be noted that Hofman 
disagrees with Collier that the definition of a data message in s 1 is broad enough to 
include hearsay evidence. Hofman maintains that the definition of data refers to the form in 
which information is kept and not the content of the message. Hofman adds that a data 
message should be treated the same way as a document in that it is admissible only if the 
author of the data message testifies about the contents of the message. For further 
discussion about whether a data message constitutes hearsay, see Hofman 2006 SACJ 
264; Collier 2005 Juta's Business Law 6-9. Regarding documentary evidence, see s 17 
(production of evidence); s 14 (production of original evidence) and s 15(b)(exceptions) of 
the ECT respectively.  
 Cyber inspectors are 
93   Also see Hofman (n 92) 262, where it is stated that the ordinary South African law on the 
admissibility of evidence will apply to data messages except where the ECT changes it. 
See inter alia, SB Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (Case D204/07) where an e-mail which 
was used to accept an employment contract was regarded as conclusive proof that the 
said employment had been accepted. Also see S v Motata (Case number 63/968/07) 
where electronic information, that is data in the form of images and sound from a cell 
phone, was admitted into evidence at the conclusion of a trial within a trial. In this case, 
Judge Motata allegedly drove into a wall of a private home whilst being under the influence 
of liquor. The owner of the home made an audio recording of the accident on his 
cellphone. The judge had challenged the admissibility of five cellphone recordings in his 
trial for driving under the influence. The recording was copied onto a computer and the 
issue arose whether this constituted real or documentary evidence. The judge was found 
guilty of drunken driving by the Johannesburg magistrate's court on 2 September 2009. 
However, he was acquitted of the other charges of obstructing the ends of justice and an 
alternative charge for resisting arrest. The judge was sentenced to a R20 000 fine or 12 
months' imprisonment for drunken driving in the Johannesburg magistrate's court on 9 
September 2009. His defence has indicated that the judge will apply for leave to appeal. 
The state has indicated that it would oppose the application. See further,  Anon 2009 
www.legalbrief.co.za/, Anon 2009a www.mg.co.za/ and Anon 2009b www.mg.co.za/ Also 
see  Motata v Nair   2009  (1) SACR 263 (T); 2009 (2) SA 575 (T); (7023/2008) [2008] 
ZAFSHC 53 (11 June 2008) regarding the admissibility of playing the recordings during the 
course of a trial-within-a-trial.  
94   See s 82(1) of the ECT. The actions of the cyber inspectors are regulated by s 80-84.  F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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empowered in terms of the Act to enter any premises and access information 
that may impact on an investigation into cybercrime. However, the provision in 
respect of search and seizure (section 82) may infringe section  14 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (the right to privacy).
95
The criminal sanctions in the ECT have been criticised for not being severe 
enough!
  
 
96 To illustrate this, section 89(1) provides a maximum period of one 
year's imprisonment for most crimes prohibited by section 86, whilst the crimes 
prohibited in sections 86(4) and (5) (matters such as denial of service-attacks) 
and crimes prohibited in section 87 (extortion, fraud and forgery) prescribe a 
fine or imprisonment not exceeding five years. However, the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communications-Related 
Information Act 70 of 2002 (the RICA) prescribes harsher measures.
97
Jurisdictional issues are regulated by section 90 of the ECT.
 Thus, 
the criminal sanctions in the ECT appear to be inadequate when compared with 
the RICA. It is submitted that more stringent penalties are required to deter 
cyber criminals. 
 
98
                                            
95   S 14 provides that everyone has a right to privacy, which includes the right not to have 
their person or home searched, their property searched, their possessions seized, or the 
privacy of their communications infringed. However, this may be limited in terms of s 36 of 
the Constitution (limitation clause). 
96   Van der Merwe et al (n 77) 78. 
97   S  51 of the RICA prescribes fines not exceeding R 2 000 000 or imprisonment not 
exceeding ten years. Regarding juristic persons, fines may increase to a maximum of   
R 5 000 000. For further evaluation of the criminal provisions of the ECT, see Van der 
Merwe et al (n 77) 75-78. 
98   Jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to hear a matter. Usually the courts will 
exercise jurisdiction regarding offences committed on South African territory only. See 
inter alia, S v Maseki 1981 (4) SA 374 (T). The general rule regarding jurisdiction was that 
when a crime was committed outside the borders of SA, a South African court will not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the case. However, there are exceptions, namely high treason, 
theft committed in a foreign country, and offences committed on board ships or on 
aircrafts. For further information see Bekker et al "The criminal courts" 37-38. Also see Bid 
Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Strang 2007 SCA 144 (RSA), where the Supreme Court of 
Appeal had to consider the constitutionality of jurisdictional arrest of a foreigner and 
whether it was aimed at founding or confirming arrest. The Court found legally competent 
alternatives to requiring arrest as a jurisdictional prerequisite where attachment is not 
possible, such as serving the defendant with summons whilst he was in SA, or establishing 
a connection between the suit and the area of jurisdiction, for example by the cause of 
action arising within the court's area of jurisdiction.  
 To illustrate this, 
section 90 of the ECT provides that a court in the Republic (SA) trying an F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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offence in terms of this act committed elsewhere will have jurisdiction in the 
following instances: 
 
(a)  where the offence was committed in the Republic;  
(b)  where part of the offence was committed in the Republic or the result of 
the offence had an effect in the Republic; 
(c)  where the offence was committed by a South African citizen or a person 
with permanent residence in the Republic or a person carrying on 
business in the Republic;  
(d)  or the offence was committed on board any ship or aircraft registered in 
the Republic or on a voyage or flight from the Republic at the time that 
the offence was committed.
99
 
 
Section 90(b) is helpful because it facilitates the prosecution of perpetrators 
who create and disseminate viruses overseas, because these viruses may 
damage our computer networks. Similarly, it facilitates the prosecution of 
overseas -based hackers who may damage our computer systems. A South 
African court will thus be vested with jurisdiction because the above-mentioned 
crimes "had an effect in the Republic". A South African court will also have 
jurisdiction if a South African national commits a cybercrime abroad based 
solely on the nationality of the perpetrator.
100  However, the jurisdictional 
provisions of the ECT are not without criticism.
101
                                            
99   It is submitted that s 90 is more comprehensive than a 22 of the COECC. Art 22 provides 
that a country has jurisdiction when an offence is committed in: 
 
(a)  its territory; 
(b)  on board a ship flying a flag of that party; 
(c)  on board an aircraft registered in that country; 
(d)  by one of its nationals if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was 
committed or if the offence was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any 
state. 
The application of s 90 is, however, limited to crimes that can be committed under the 
ECT.  
100    S 90(c) is regarded as being "too broad". It appears that where no country has jurisdiction 
in respect of the offence, then the nationality of the perpetrator should play an important 
role in deciding where he should be prosecuted. This conforms with art 22 of the COECC. 
101  S 90(d) is also said to be problematic, because it differs from s 28(1)(d) of the Magistrate's 
Courts Act 32 of 1944, which requires the "whole cause of action" to take place within a 
particular court or district (territorial borders), whilst s 90(d) provides for jurisdiction in 
terms of nationality rather than because the offence was committed within its territorial 
borders. It is also problematic if the cybercrime is committed beyond our borders but the 
offender is prosecuted in South Africa. Then the question arises as to which regional court F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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4.3  Recent case law addressing cybercrime  
In Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services,
102 the court had to consider inter 
alia whether a computer print-out which was a copy, complied with the best 
evidence rule or could not be admitted into evidence unless properly proved. 
The court found that firstly, the plaintiff's failure to object to the evidence during 
the trial precluded him from relying on the best evidence rule only during 
argument. The plaintiff had also referred extensively to the print-out during 
evidence without objecting, with the result that it amounted to a tacit waiver of 
the best evidence principle. Secondly, the court found that as the print-out was 
generated by a computer, it was governed by the ECT. Thus, it examined 
section 15 of the ECT and found that section 15(1)(a) prohibits the exclusion 
from evidence of a data message on the mere grounds that it was generated by 
a computer and not by a natural person, and section  15(1)(b) on the mere 
grounds that it is not in its original form. However, the court found that the print-
out was admissible into evidence not in terms of section 15 of the ECT but in 
terms of the court's statutory discretion to admit hearsay evidence in terms of 
the  Law of Evidence Amendment Act  45 of 1988. This decision has been 
criticised for not providing clarity on the effect of section 15 of the ECT on the 
authenticity rule and the hearsay rule.
103
In  S v Ndiki
  
 
104
                                                                                                                               
or district court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. The ECT has also been criticised for 
"missing the opportunity to address some of the jurisdictional problems, particularly the 
regulation of jurisdictional connecting factors in e-contracts". In this regard, see Sibanda 
"Choice of law" 264. S 90 is also criticised for failing to address sexual crimes. See Van 
Zyl 2008 JCRDL 235 in this regard.  
102  2006 (4) All SA 165 (W). The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages as a result of an 
alleged wrongful imprisonment and wrongful deprivation of privileges as an awaiting-trial 
detainee. The documents before the court comprised print-outs reflecting the monitoring of 
the plaintiff from the date of his release on parole. 
103  For a critical analysis about the case, see Collier 2005 Juta's Business Law 6-9. 
  the state sought to introduce certain documentary evidence 
consisting of computer-generated print-outs, designated as exhibits D1-D9, 
104    2008 (2) SACR 252. The accused was charged with a number of counts of fraud and theft 
in connection with the delivery of medical supplies to the Department of Health and 
Welfare in the Eastern Cape. The problem arose when the state relied on the evidence of 
computer printouts which constituted necessary evidence to prove the fraudulent actions. 
The accused objected to the admissibility of such print-outs as the ECT had not come into 
operation at the time of the commission of the offence. The court found that since the F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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during the course of a criminal trial. The accused objected to the admission of 
these exhibits as a result of which the court conducted a trial-within-a trial to 
determine the true nature of the print-outs, the class of document into which 
they fell and whether their admission was sanctioned by the provisions of any 
legislation dealing with the admission of documentary evidence. The court held 
that if a computer print-out contained a statement of which an individual had 
personal knowledge and which was stored in the computer's memory, then its 
use in evidence would depend on the credibility of an identifiable individual and 
would therefore constitute hearsay. On the other hand, where the probative 
value of a statement in a print-out depended on the 'credibility' of the computer, 
then section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 would not 
apply.
105 The court found that because certain individuals had signed exhibits 
D1 to D4, the computer had been used as a tool to create the relevant 
documentation. Therefore, these documents constituted hearsay. Exhibits D5 
to D9 had been created without human intervention and such evidence 
constituted real evidence. Therefore, the admissibility of this evidence 
depended on the reliability and accuracy of the computer and its operating 
systems and processes. The duty to prove such accuracy and reliability lay with 
the state.
106 However, exhibits D1-D9 were found to have complied with section 
221 of the Criminal Procedure Act  51 of 1977, and they were therefore 
provisionally admitted into evidence.
107
                                                                                                                               
documents in question were admissible in terms of the existing law, it was unnecessary to 
make a finding on the retrospective application of the ECT.  
105  It should be noted that s 3 gives the court a discretion to admit hearsay evidence if it is in 
the interests of justice. 
106    S 34 requires documents to be made by a person (in terms of Civil Proceedings Evidence 
Act 25 of 1965). It was clear from the evidence that the computer was used as a tool with 
respect to exhibits D1 to D4. Although printed on a computer, the exhibits were signed by 
a functionary as envisaged by s 34(4). Therefore, this was 'made' by a functionary as 
envisaged by s  34(1). The court held that exhibits D5-D9 did not comply with the 
requirements of s 34 as these exhibits were not 'made' by a functionary. 
107  It should be noted that s 221 deals with the admissibility of certain trade or business 
records provided that certain conditions are met. The court found that the print-outs were 
documents and they fell within the category of a record relating to a trade or business. The 
statements the state sought to introduce in exhibits D1-D4 had been obtained from 
persons who had personal knowledge of their contents, whilst the information in these 
statements had been sorted out and collated by a computer to produce exhibits D5-D9. 
  The court's progressive approach in F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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regarding part of the computer-based evidence as real evidence has been 
lauded.
108
South African banks are also vulnerable to cybercrime.
  
 
The above discussion demonstrates that our courts are adopting a cautious 
approach in cybercrime cases. Although the Ndiki decision is encouraging, it is 
submitted that more clear and concise judicial guidance on the admissibility and 
evidential weight of electronic evidence is needed in future cases. 
 
4.4  The South African banking sector 
109  Banks have 
expressed concern about the increase in phishing schemes.
110 Cybercrime is 
said to be increasing rapidly in South Africa. Many companies are said to 
underestimate the threat from phishing, data loss, identity theft, information 
leakage and other cyber activities. It is also acknowledged that many of the 
phishing operators are part of the Nigerian 419 scam.
111 The recent bank SMS 
scam case has also raised serious questions about the security of online 
banking.
112
                                            
108  For further discussion about the case see Van der Merwe et al (n 77) 121-123, where 
Professor Van  der Merwe lauds the court's progressive approach. Van der Merwe's 
comments are supported. 
 However, the establishment of organisations such as SABRIC to 
combat cybercrime in the banking industry is lauded. SABRIC provides the 
banking industry with crime risk information management services and 
facilitates inter-bank initiatives to reduce the risk of organised bank-related 
109  See  inter alia  Anon 2007 www.crime-research.org/  and Herselman and Warren 2004 
www.dealin.edu.au/ It is advocated in the latter article that South Africa should learn from 
and apply the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
guidelines (2002) to safeguard businesses against cybercrime.  
110  The major banks such as Absa, Standard Bank and First National Bank have confirmed 
breach of their clients' accounts by phishing schemes during 2007. See Anon  2007 
www.iol.co.za/ Also see Van der Merwe et al (n 77) 66-67 for further discussion about the 
vulnerability of South African banks. 
111  The so-called '419' swindle is named after the article in the Nigerian penal code which 
outlaws it. 
112  It  involved a Vodacom employee who was working with a syndicate to intercept SMS 
notifications from banks to their customers. It has been reported that about R 7-million was 
siphoned off from customers' accounts as result of this scam. See Chelemu 2009 The 
Times 6. F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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crime through effective public private partnerships.
113
South Africa has adopted the COECC but not ratified it. The treaty contains 
important provisions to assist law enforcement (the police) in their fight against 
transborder cybercrime. Therefore, South Africa needs to ratify the cybercrime 
treaty to avoid becoming an easy target for international cybercrime. The South 
African government seems to be presently focused on basic service delivery 
and more traditional crimes, given the current situation in the country where 
crime and poverty are rife. However, the establishment of the Computer 
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) indicates that the aim to tackle 
cybercrime is gathering momentum.
 It is submitted that the 
private sector has a vested interest in addressing bank-related crime. 
 
4.5  Way forward 
114  The South African Law  Reform 
Commission (SALRC) has also recommended the introduction of legislation on 
the protection of personal information (so-called  "information protection 
legislation or information privacy legislation").
115
It is submitted that South Africa can learn from the approaches followed in other 
countries. We can take note of the UK model (as in the CMA) by introducing 
stricter penalties in the ECT. We need to prescribe harsher penalties to deter 
cyber criminals. We can also examine the feasibility of introducing collaborative 
initiatives involving the police, the private sector and academics to combat 
  It is submitted that the 
promulgation of information protection legislation in South Africa will impact on 
inter alia the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (the PAIA) and 
the ECT as far as information privacy is concerned. 
 
                                            
113  SABRIC was established in 2002 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Banking 
Association. Its key stakeholders are the four major South African banks, namely, 
Standard Bank, Nedbank, Absa and First National Bank. For further information, see 
SABRIC 2009 www.sabric.co.za. 
114  See Anon 2007 it-online.co.za/; Anon 2009 www.ib.com/ The latter article commends the 
actions of the SA government in reducing software piracy. 
115  See SALRC Discussion Paper 109. It should be noted that information protection relates to 
the protection of a person's right to privacy. The right to privacy is protected in terms of s 
14 of the Constitution. The Protection of Personal Information Bill is regarded as a 
mechanism for the protection of the right to information protection and will be enacted at 
some time during 2009.  
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cybercrime (as in the US and the UK). It is important to involve all role players 
in the struggle against cybercrime. The role of the Australian Banking 
Association in combating rising levels of cybercrime in the banking industry can 
be favourably compared to the role of SABRIC. It is important to enlist the aid of 
the private sector to combat cybercrime. The introduction of a Cyber Appellate 
Tribunal similar to that in India will also ensure that cyber cases are given 
priority. It will also lessen the case load on our already over-burdened courts. 
Indeed, our police and judiciary should also become more cybercrime savvy, 
like their Indian counterparts. Last but not least, we should follow the US in 
ratifying the COECC, as the treaty offers a global approach to the global 
problem of cybercrime.  
 
4.6  Africa perspective 
African countries have been criticised for dealing inadequately with cybercrime 
as their law enforcement agencies are inadequately equipped in terms of 
personnel, intelligence and infrastructure, and the private sector is also lagging 
behind in curbing cybercrime. African countries are pre-occupied with attending 
to pressing issues such as poverty, the Aids crisis, the fuel crisis, political 
instability, ethnic instability and traditional crimes such as murder, rape and 
theft, with the result that the fight against cybercrime is lagging behind. It is 
submitted that international mutual legal and technical assistance should be 
rendered to African countries by corporate and individual entities to effectively 
combat cybercrime in Africa. African countries need to build partnerships to 
combat internet crime and corruption. Nevertheless, it is laudable that other 
African countries (besides South Africa) are making attempts to address 
cybercrime. Kenya has enacted cyber legislation to combat cyber crimes.
116
                                            
116  The Kenyan Communications Act was passed by the Kenyan Parliament and signed by 
the President during January 2009. The Act includes legislation on cybercrime in s 83 W-Z 
and s 84 A-F on inter alia unauthorised access to computer data, access with intent to 
commit offences, unauthorised access to and interception of computer services, damaging 
or denying access to computer systems, unlawful possession of devices and data, 
electronic  fraud, tampering with computer source documents and publishing obscene 
material in electronic form. See further, Cybercrime Law 2009 
 
Botswana has presented a Bill on Cybercrime and Computer-Related Crimes to 
the National Assembly, which will go for a third reading before it is signed into 
www.cybercrimelaw.net/  F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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law.
117 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also 
met to discuss inter alia  the implementation of ICT policy and legislation, 
access and interconnection regulation, the granting of universal access and the 
provision of guidelines for gradual transition to open markets.
118
5  Conclusion   
  There is a 
growing recognition that cybercrime is thriving on the African continent because 
of a lack of IT knowledge by the public and the absence of suitable legal 
frameworks to deal with cybercrime at national and regional levels. Attempts 
are therefore being made to address cybercrime.  
 
 
The global nature of computer technology presents a challenge to nations to 
address cybercrime.
119 Domestic solutions are inadequate because cyberspace 
has no geographic or political boundaries, and many computer systems can be 
easily accessed from anywhere in the world. It is also difficult to obtain accurate 
cybercrime statistics because an unknown number of crimes go undetected 
and unreported. It is also costly to develop and maintain security and other 
preventative measures. International financial organisations are also common 
targets for computer fraud and embezzlement schemes.
120  Organised crime 
and terrorist groups are also using sophisticated computer technology to 
bypass government detection and carry out destructive acts of violence.
121
                                            
117  Ibid. 
 It is 
118  See Ogundeji 2008 www.thestandard.com/ 
119 The following reasons illustrate the difficulty in addressing cybercrime: the lack of tools for 
the use of police to tackle the problem; the fact that the 'old' laws do not fit the 'new' crimes 
being committed; the fact that the new laws have not adjusted to the reality on the ground; 
that there are few precedents to be used for guidance; that there are debates over privacy 
issues which hamper the ability of enforcement agents to gather evidence needed  to 
prosecute new cases; and that the distrust between police and computer professionals 
hampers close co-operation between the two parties to effectively address the cybercrime 
problem and make the Internet a safe place. See Singh (n 72) 1. 
120  See Bazelon et al (n 1) 306. 
121  The case of Rami Yousef who orchestrated the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by 
using encryption to store details of his scheme on his laptop computer is a case in point. 
Ibid. F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
67/360 
thus a continuous uphill battle to develop computer crime legislation that 
applies to both domestic and international audiences.
122
The efforts of professional organisations such as the International Criminal 
Police Organisation (Interpol) are necessary to combat cybercrime. To this end, 
Interpol has provided technical guidance in cybercrime detection, investigation 
and evidence collection.
 
 
123 The role of multi-national organisations such as the 
Commonwealth of Nations, the Group of 8 (the G8) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (the OECD) is important because 
their work encompasses a broader territorial environment.
124 The COECC's role 
is also lauded as it attempts to establish consistency in the cybercrime laws of 
various countries. However, many states still have to sign, let alone ratify, the 
Convention to serve as a deterrent.
125
Although technology advancement is welcomed, it has created numerous 
challenges. There is a need for security-related features on the internet to 
respond to these challenges. Countries should strive to strike  a balance 
between protecting the safety and security of individuals and guaranteeing the 
free dissemination of information and opinion.
  The unanimous participation of all 
nations is required in order to achieve meaningful prosecution. 
 
126
                                            
122  Regarding the practical impediments to international investigation and enforcement, see 
Miquelan-Weissmann (n 3) 335-336. 
123  Interpol is co-operating with credit card companies to combat payment fraud by building a 
database on Interpol's web site. Interpol is also making efforts to establish a network for 
collating information relating to illegal activities on the Internet. Regional efforts have also 
been made to combat cybercrime by bodies such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC), the Council of Europe (the COE), the European Union and the 
Organisation of American States (the OAS). However, these regional efforts are limited to 
specific states. See Xingan (n 15) 3-4. 
124  International organisations examine the promotion of security awareness at both the 
international and national levels, the harmonisation of national legislation, coordination and 
co-operation in law enforcement and they direct anti-cybercrime actions. 
125  International co-operation is required to punish cybercrime offenders. Thus, international 
co-operation is limited to the particular participants and treaty signatories who have 
enacted domestic cybercrime legislation. 
126    The efforts by the UK Home Office to censure sex offencers on the Internet are lauded. 
See Anon (n 53) 9. 
 H Jahankhani calls for a global 
digital community to take steps to evaluate and safeguard cyber legislation to 
achieve  efficient and socially responsible use of the Internet, because the F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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global community is responsible for evaluating such legislation.
127 An effective 
fight against cybercrime requires increased, rapid and efficient international co-
operation in criminal matters. Regarding the problem with jurisdiction, Brenner 
suggests that a country should expand the "territorial notion" of jurisdiction to 
prosecute so that it allows a country to prosecute regardless of whether the 
offender's conduct occurred in whole or in part in the prosecuting country's 
territory.
128  Brenner also suggests that countries should evaluate their 
procedural law governing collection and analysis of evidence to include 
intangible evidence derived from cybercrimes as opposed to traditional crimes 
which generate tangible evidence.
129 The courts also need to understand the 
technical characteristics of the Internet and develop well-settled precedents to 
address the question of jurisdiction in an intelligent and logical manner. Indeed 
the judicious use of criminal sanctions and administrative regulation is mooted 
as an effective way to prevent cybercrime.
130
It is submitted that the advent of the ECT goes a long way towards addressing 
cybercrime in South Africa. However, there is room for improvement.
  
 
131  As 
stated earlier, South Africa needs to ratify the COECC to avoid becoming 
vulnerable to international cybercrime. A need also arises for the introduction of 
more specialised prosecutors and specialised procedures to facilitate the 
prosecution of cybercrime cases on a priority basis. Internet users should also 
be encouraged to share the burden of securing informational privacy where 
feasible.
132
                                            
127    See Jahankhani (n 26) 10. 
128    She also suggests that countries should impose their own criminal laws on their citizens 
when the citizens are abroad, which would facilitate prosecution when a crime was 
committed abroad. The 'love bug' virus has demonstrated that cybercriminals can exploit 
gaps in a country's penal and procedural laws to evade prosecution. Brenner (n 5) 14.  
129    Id. 
130    Brenner and Clarke (n 3) 709. 
131  The ECT is criticised for not having severe criminal penalties. It is recommended that the 
criminal jurisdictional limit and the anti-spam provision in the ECT should be amended. 
See Van der Merwe (n 1) 319 in this regard. 
132  See Allan (n11) 149-150. 
  Computer ethics education should also be taught to children in 
schools to educate them about the negative consequences of committing 
cybercrime. The possibility exists that new forms of cybercrime will emerge with 
evolving technology. New cyber laws should therefore be introduced to respond F CASSIM    PER 2009(12)4 
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to these rapid changes. There should also be continuous research and training 
of  IT security personnel, finance services sector personnel, police officers, 
prosecutors and the judiciary to keep them abreast of advancing computer 
technology. At the end of the day, a balanced approach that considers the 
protection of fundamental human rights and the need for the effective 
prosecution of cybercrimes is the way forward. 
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